British and U.S. Hate Speech Legislation:  A Comparison by Courtney, Nathan
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 19 | Issue 2 Article 8
12-1-1993
British and U.S. Hate Speech Legislation: A
Comparison
Nathan Courtney
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Nathan Courtney, British and U.S. Hate Speech Legislation: A Comparison, 19 Brook. J. Int'l L. 727 (1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol19/iss2/8
NOTE
BRITISH AND UNITED STATES
HATE SPEECH LEGISLATION:
A COMPARISON
I. INTRODUCTION
In both the United States and Great Britain, the last few
years have been marked by an increase in the number of racist
and anti-Semitic incidents in the workplace, on college cam-
puses, and on the streets.1 These incidents have been coined
instances of "hate speech."2 The term refers to a broad catego-
ry of speech which degrades a person or class of people based
on a person's race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or other
distinguishing status. Within this larger category, hate speech
can be divided into two subdivisions: "speech addressed to the
public" and "speech directed at individuals."8
Legislatures in both Great Britain and the United States
are struggling for ways to address these repugnant episodes
while not infringing on cherished notions of free speech.4 In
the Race Relations Act of 1965,' Great Britain targeted racist
1. Bryan Appleyard, Still in the Swastika's Shadow, THE SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Oct. 14, 1990, § 3, at 5; Howell Raines, London Police Faulted as Racial
Attacks Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1988, at Al.
2. See Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321 (1989).
3. Jon Wiener, Letter, 77 ACADEME 35 (1991).
4. See Austria Offers Legislation to Make it Easier to Prosecute Neo-Nazis,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at A3.
5. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (Eng.). Penalties for a conviction
are steep: a maximum of two years' imprisonment or a fine of £1000, or both. Id.
§ 6(3). While hatred based upon religion is noticeably missing from the law, the
Public Order Act, 1936 (POA 1936) and its progeny were all used to punish anti-
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hate speech of the first subdivision: "speech addressed to the
public." Partly to fulfill its obligations under the United Na-
tions International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination,' the British made it illegal for a
speaker or a publisher to incite people to racial hatred. Pre-
mised on the notion that such public and persuasive speech
enabled Nazism to flourish in the 1930s, this law aimed to
curtail racist and anti-Semitic propaganda.7
More recently, the British targeted hate speech of the
second subdivision: "speech directed at individuals."8 In the
Public Order Act, 1986 (POA 1986), Parliament made it illegal
to use "threatening, abusive, or insulting words" that cause an-
other "harassment, alarm, or distress."9 While this law was
designed to cover abusive speech in general, it is viewed by the
British as another weapon in the fight against racist speech.
The United States has never ratified the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation and does not have laws which prohibit incitement to
racial hatred.'0 Generally, the United States is much more
tolerant of racist and other harassing speech than is Great
Britain. Unlike the British, the approach in the United States
is to deny government the power to "decide What is 'legitimate'
speech and what is not."1 Nonetheless, there have been sev-
eral recent attempts to legislate in the area of racist speech.
Semitic propaganda. Patricia M. Leopold, Incitement to Racial Hatred, 1977 PUB.
L. 389, 392.
6. United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination].
7. See R. v. Relf & Cole, 1 Crim. App. (S) 111 (1979) (Eng.), discussed infra
note 50.
8. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
9. Id.
10. Mhe reservation and the failure to ratify the convention separates the
United States from an evolving world standard. As discussed below, this position
represents an extreme commitment to the First Amendment at the expense of
antidiscrimination goals." Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2345.
11. See Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free
Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORMD L.J. 161, 167 (1987).
728 [Vol. XIX:2
HATE SPEECH LEGISLATION
As lawmakers in the United States confront the issue of
whether or not to legislate against hate speech, they may
choose to learn from the successes and mistakes that the Brit-
ish have made in their twenty-five-year history of incitement
and harassment laws. Part I of this paper will describe the
history of the British laws, Part II will discuss how similar
laws have been dealt with in the United States courts, and
Part IR will discuss whether it is feasible for the United States
to adopt either the British incitement or harassment laws.
II. GREAT BRITAIN'S INCITEMENT AND HARASSMENT LAWS
The history of the British incitement and harassment laws
can be traced back to the seventeenth-century offense of sedi-
tious libel. This law embodied the concept that those who
spread hatred of individuals and groups threaten not only
those groups but the security of the government itself.' As
the incitement and harassment laws developed, the protection
of government security became less of a goal, but the emphasis
remained on those who incited hatred of other groups.
A Seditious Libel
All of Great Britain's hate speech regulations are premised
upon the common law offense of seditious libel. This offense
punished the publication of, or the articulation of, words with
"an intention to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite
disaffection against the person of Her Majesty... , or to pro-
mote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes
of [her] subjects.""3 Since the law punished "bring[ing] into
hatred" or "promot[ing] feelings of ill-will," it targeted .the
speaker who was persuasive enough to convince others of his
contempt for the monarchy or of his hatred of a class of its
subjects. This law was not, therefore, directly concerned with
12. See ANTHONY LESTER & GEOFFREY BINDMAN, RACE AND LAW IN GREAT
BRrrAiN 345 (1972) [hereinafter RACE AND LAW].
13. Id.
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the harmful effect that words might have on the Queen or one
of her subjects.
Although the law was used primarily to punish those who
posed a threat to the monarchy, on several occasions it was
also used to punish what would today be recognized as hate
speech. 4 R. v. Osborne concerned the publishers of a pam-
phlet which asserted that certain Jewish immigrants living in
London had killed a woman and her child because the father of
the child was a Christian. 5 Following the distribution of the
pamphlet, several of the Jews named were beaten and were
threatened with death if they did not depart London.1" The
publishers of the anti-Semitic pamphlet were found guilty of
seditious libel.'7
Since the turn of the century, prosecutions for seditious
libel have rarely succeeded. 8 One of the reasons for the law's
ineffectiveness is that, under the common law, the defendant
was only guilty if his or her speech led to a direct incitement to
violence or public disorder.' While racist speech may provide
the foundation for future acts of violence against particular
groups, it is difficult to prove that one speaker's words directly
led to a particular violent episode. Thus, as time went on,
Britain's prohibitions on racist speech required less and less of
a connection between the speech and violence.
B. The Public Order Act, 1936 -
In order to address the inadequacies of the sedition laws,
in 1936 Parliament passed section 5 of the Public Order Act,
1936 (POA 1936). Like the sedition laws, punishment under
the POA 1936 required a nexus between speech and violence.
The law provided the following:
14. Id.
15. 2 Swanst. 503n (1732), cited in RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 345.
16. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 345.
17. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 345.
18. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 347.
19. Leopold, supra note 5, at 391.
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Any person in any public place or at a public meeting to use
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach
of the peace is likely to be occasioned shall be guilty of an
offense.20
A plain reading of the POA 1936 reveals two notable changes
from the sedition laws. First, speech could be punished even if
it did not provoke actual violence as long as it was "likely" to
provoke such violence. Second, mere intent to provoke violence
could be punished.
Section 5 proved useful in controlling the rise of British
fascism prior to and during World War U1.21 Police, in dis-
guise, would attend meetings of the British Union of Fascists
where they recorded insulting words that were later used in
the prosecution of the group's prominent leaders.' "The result
was a definite modification of [flascist propaganda with less
provocation to Jews and other anti-[f]ascists."2
In Jordan v. Burgoyne,24 a leader of the National Socialist
Movement was charged with violating section 5 after making
various anti-Semitic remarks while addressing a meeting in
Trafalgar Square. Addressing a sizeable crowd of both support-
ers and hecklers, he proclaimed that, "Hitler was right,... our
real enemies, the people we should have fought, were not Hit-
ler and the national socialists of Germany but world Jewry *and
its associates in this country."' At trial, a "reasonable man7
argument was used to acquit Jordan: the judge held that his
words "were not likely to lead ordinary reasonable persons
attending the meeting ... to commit breaches of the peace
.... "26 On appeal, however, Lord Parker, C.J. of the Division-
al Court rejected the "reasonable man" approach and concluded
20. Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, § 5 (Eng.).
21. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 351.
22. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 351.
23. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 351.
24. 2 All E.R. 225 (Q.B. 1963).
25. Id. at 226.
26. Id.
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that Jordan "must take his audience as he finds them."27
Since Jordan's speech resulted in "complete disorder" among
his audience, he was convicted of violating section 5 of the
POA 1936.28
As time went on, British officials found the incitement
laws to be an insufficient obstacle to racist speech making. In
the mid-1960s the ultra right wing National Front (NF) began
achieving widespread support among the British lower and
middle class.29 The group's popularity can be traced to the
widespread resentment over the immigration of people of color
from Commonwealth countries."0 In their efforts to gain fur-
ther support, many NF leaders who campaigned for seats in
Parliament made insulting comments about the new immi-
grants.
Since the NF had shifted its focus from disturbing the
peace to gaining electoral support, it abandoned its usual calls
to violence. The group was primarily concerned with persuad-
ing others of its particular brand of racism in order to win
votes. Since section 5 of the POA 1936 did not address speech
that lacked threats of violence or resulted in violence, many of
the members' speeches went unpunished.
In the face of increasing numbers of racist and fascist
speeches, elected officials came under pressure to legislate
against these types of less virulent hate speech. 1 Thus, in
order to curtail racist speech that did not directly incite people
to violence, Britain's laws under the Race Relations Acts of
1965 and 1976 prohibited speech that merely incited people to
hatred of racial groups. Like seditious libel and section 5 of the
POA 1936, these laws did not directly protect the individual
who was the victim of abusive racist 'speech; rather, they fo-
27. Id. at 227.
28. Id.
29. ARYEH NEER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY 149-50 (1979).
30. Id. at 150. During the mid-1960s, at least 100,000 people of Asian or Afri-
can origin migrated to Great Britain each year. Id.
31. Leopold, supra note 5, at 393. A petition signed by 140,000 citizens called
for incitement legislation. Leopold, supra note 5, at 393 n.21.
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cused on the speaker who was likely to persuade others of his
or her racist views.
C. The Race Relations Act, 1965
Great Britain was not alone in its call for laws that pun-
ished racist propaganda. In 1963 the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination to respond to an increase in
the appearance of swastikas around the world. 2 As a party to
the ensuing International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Great Britain agreed to ."de-
clare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred .... 33
In 1965 Parliament passed section 6 of The Race Relations
Act, 1965 (RRA 1965). Under section 6, a person is guilty of in-
citement to racial hatred if
with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public
in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race or ethnic or na-
tional origins: (a) he publishes or distributes written matter
which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or (b) he uses in
any public place or at any public meeting words which are
threatening, abusive or insulting, being matter or words
likely to stir up hatred against that section on grounds of
colour, race or ethnic or national origin.3
Section 6 of RRA 1965 is notable in several respects: first, it
reverts back to the seditious libel standard in that it requires
that the speaker have the "intent" to stir up hatred;- 5 second,
32. See RICHARD B. LMILCH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 130 (1979).
33. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, su-
pra note 6, art. 4(a). Under article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178, Great Britain was
already obligated to undertake the necessary steps to prohibit "any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence." Id.
34. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (Eng.).
35. It will be remembered that the POA 1936 required a finding of either the
1993] 733
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it punishes only the cruder forms of speech; third, it targets
only public racist commentary; and, finally, the use of the law
to combat racist speech requires the consent of the Attorney
General.
1. Intent to Stir Up Hatred
The new intent requirement made it very difficult for the
Crown to win convictions under the RRA 1965. The inherent
difficulty in proving that someone intends to stir up racial ha-
tred was illustrated in a case involving the prosecution of four
members of the Racial Preservation Society for their publish-
ing of a newspaper entitled Southern News. 6 The newspaper
declared as its goal the "return of people of other races from
this 'overcrowded island' to 'their own countries." 7 In defend-
ing against the claim that they intended to incite racial hatred,
the authors argued that their newspaper had educational value
as a means for addressing important social issues.38 Because
the prosecutors were unable to prove that the defendants had
the intention to instill in the populace any hatred of immi-
grants, the authors were acquitted.39
The failure to convict the publishers of the Southern News
highlights one of the dangers lurking behind the incitement
laws. The failed prosecution gave "a measure of respectability
to racialists and their organisations .... After the unsuccess-
ful prosecution in the Southern News case, there was an in-
crease in that type of quasi-educational racialist literature.
intent to incite to violence or the likelihood of violence being brought about
through the particular speech. See discussion supra part IIB.
36. See Race Act Not a Curb, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1968, at 2 [here-
inafter Race Act Not a Curb] (discussing unreported Southern News case); Four
Cleared in Race Act Trial, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1968, at 2 [hereinafter
Four Cleared in Race Act Trial]. Many decisions over prosecutions brought under
the incitement laws were not published in either the official or unofficial British
reporters.
37. See Longacre, The Race Relations Act of 1965: An Evaluation of the Incite-
ment Provision, 11 RACE 125 (1969), cited in Lasson, supra note 11, at 169.
38. See Lasson, supra note 11, at 169.
39. See Race Charge Dropped, THE TIMES (London), May 1, 1968, at 4.
40. Leopold, supra note 5, at 398, (citing Dickey, English Law and Incitement
734 [Vol. XIX:2
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Moreover, the case gave immense news coverage to an other-
wise insignificant newspaper. Indeed, upon acquittal, the au-
thors reprinted the issue of Southern News that was the sub-
ject of the case and sold it as a "Souvenir Edition-The Paper
the Government Tried to Suppress."
2. Cruder Forms of Speech
Section 6(a) of the RRA 1965 targets the same type of
speech ("threatening, abusive or insulting") that was pro-
scribed under the POA 1936. Thus, the law applies only to the
cruder forms of racist expression. As the cases bear out, the
"crudeness" of particular words varies over time.42 The first
conviction under section 6 came in 1967 against Colin Jordan,
the aforementioned leader of the National Socialist Movement
who had been convicted under the POA 1936.4s Jordan had
been arrested after publishing and distributing a pamphlet
entitled The Coloured Invasion in which he asserted that "[t]he
presence of this [cloloured million in our midst is a menace to
to Racial Hatred, 11 RACE 311, 321-327 (1969)).
41. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 371.
42. John Kingsley Read was tried in January 1978 for telling an audience
that he was under a court injunction prohibiting slurs against colored immigrants
and, therefore, would talk about "niggers, wogs, and coons." NEIER, supra note 29,
at 155. Read also spoke of the death of a young Asian, saying, "[olne down one
million to go." NEIER, supra note 29, at 155. Read was acquitted by an all-white
jury after the judge instructed the jury that the term "nigger" was harmless.
When he attended schools in Australia, the judge explained, he was nicknamed
"nigger" because "he sang songs in an aboriginal language. Spectators in the 6ourt-
room greeted the acquittal with applause." NEIER, supra note 29, at 155; Geoffrey
Bindman, What Happened to Racial Incitement, 87 LAW SOc'Y GAZETTE 25 (1990).
In a modem example of the same type of speech, Bill Galbraith, a
Cheltenham businessman who called a black Conservative parliamentary candidate,
John Taylor, a "bloody nigger," "is to face prosecution for alleged incitement to
racial hatred." Peter Vidor, Race Hatred Case Filed Against Cheltenham Tory, THE
TIMES (London), Apr. 13, 1991, at 3.
43. Colin Jordan Gaoled for 18 Months, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 1967,
at 9 [hereinafter Colin Gaoled]; see also RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 368.
1993] 735
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our nation." Jordan was sentenced to eighteen months im-
prisonment.45
Racist groups have been able to avoid operation of the
incitement laws by "expressing their views without overt
threats, abuse or insults."46 The two cases described above
vividly illustrate this phenomenon. In 1967 Colin Jordan
served eighteen months for publishing The Coloured Invasion;
whereas, in 1968, the authors of Southern News went unpun-
ished for calling for the "return of people of other races from
this 'overcrowded island' to 'their own countries." ' Both of
these editorials conveyed the same message, yet the publishers
of the more recent publication went unpunished.
3. Public Occasions
Section 6 of the RRA 1965 maintains the same focus on
public hate speech that was established in the original com-
mon law offense of seditious libel. Thus the law applies only to
written materials or words spoken on a public occasion. 8
One-on-one instances of racial harassment, therefore, are not
covered by the law. The emphasis on public speech shows that
the goal of the statute is not to protect the feelings of those
against whom racism is directed. Instead, the focus is on the
"speech's likely effect on its presumed consumers-those mnost
likely to be persuaded by it." 9
This emphasis is consistent with the UN's attempt to deal
with Nazi-like propaganda." Indeed, when proposing the bill
44. Colin Gaoled, supra note 43, at 9.
45. Colin Gaoled, supra note 43, at 9.
46. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 370.
47. RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 370.
48. David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445,
501 (1987).
49. Id. at 500.
50. See R. v. Relf & Cole, 1 Crim. App. (S) 111, 114 (1979) (Eng.). In this
case, Relf and Cole were sentenced to prison for having published leaflets contain-
ing derogatory comments made toward members of the West Indian London com-
munity. One such leaflet was entitled "Notice Wog Nuisance" and read, [o]wing to
736 [Vol. XIX:2
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to the House of Commons, the Home Secretary explained that
section 6 was "designed to deal with more dangerous, persis-
tent and insidious forms of propaganda campaigns-the cam-
paign which, over a period of time, engenders hate which be-
gets violence."5' Congruous with this emphasis, the prosecu-
tion of seventeen-year-old Christopher Britton failed.52
Britton, a "wretched little youth," had placed racialist bulletins
("Blacks Not Wanted Here") at the front door of a member of
Parliament, and wrapped one of them around a beer bottle
which he then hurled through the official's glass front door. 3
The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that a member of
Parliament did not constitute a member of the "public at large"
as described in section 6(a)." Lord Parker, C.J. went on to
note that he did not believe that Parliament envisioned the
prosecution of such small scale offenders, even if Britton's ac-
tions were technically violative of section 6."
While the emphasis in section 6 on speech addressed to
the public prevents prosecutors from wasting time on insig-
nificant cases, 5 this emphasis also has its detrimental as-
an increase in the nuisance caused by unsupervised wogs on this estate, a wog
warden has been engaged, and wogs not wearing a collar bearing the owner's
name and address, will be taken to Leamington Police Station." Id. at 113. Anoth-
er leaflet was entitled "Jungle News" and stated that London had suffered "400
crimes a month by a gang of muggers." Id. at 112.
To justify the prison sentence, Judge Lawton compared Relf and Cole's pam-
phlets to Nazi propaganda. While comparing the "lies" found in "Jungle News" to
the repetition of lies concerning Jews in Nazi Germany, he remarked that, "the
constant repetition of lies might in the end lead some people into thinking that
the lies are true." Id. at 114.
51. See generally Rt. Hon. Sir Frank Soskice, Q.C., M.P., Second Reading De-
bate, in 711 Hansard, cols. 926-43, cited in RACE AND LAW, supra note 12, at 368.
52. R. v. Britton, 1 All E.R. 486 (Q.B. 1967).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 487.
55. Id. at 488.
56. In the first year after the 1976 amendment, many of the defendants fac-
ing charges of incitement were youths. Roger Cotterrel, Prosecuting Incitement to
Racial Hatred, 1982 PuB. L. 378, (citing PAUL GORDON, INCITEMENT TO RACIAL
HATRED (1982)). Many of the defendants are young first-time offenders for whom it
is difficult to distinguish "determined political action from mere delinquency." Id.
at 380.
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pects. For instance, several section 6 prosecutions have in-
volved speeches made at Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park.7
This part of the park is world-renowned as a place to hear
soapbox orators speak on a wide variety of issues of public
interest." Because of the importance of Speakers' Corner as a
symbol of free speech, it is a momentous occasion when some-
one is arrested there simply for speaking.
4. Consent of the Attorney General
To counter criticisms that section 6 would constitute an
unjust infringement on free speech, the law requires that no
prosecution be brought without the Attorney General's con-
sent.59 This requirement was thought to serve two functions.
First, in order to avoid biased prosecutions, section 6(3) takes
the matter out of the jurisdiction of the local police.60 Second,
the law rules out potentially frivolous private civil claims of
incitement.6'
In some cases, the Attorney General has failed in its
charge to prevent biased prosecutions. In the late 1960s, for
instance, there were several notable prosecutions of leaders of
the Black Liberation Movement. In one case, Michael Abdul
Malik (Michael X) was sentenced to twelve months in prison
for having asserted that whites are "vicious and nasty peo-
ple."62 At trial Michael X agreed -that his speech was offensive
57. Four members of the Universal Coloured People's Association were found
guilty of incitement to racial hatred for speeches made in Hyde Park. Sentences
Today on Four Coloured Men, THE TIMES (London), Nov, 29, 1967, at 3 [hereinaf-
ter Sentences Today]; Race Speeches: £270 Fines, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 30,
1987, at 20. For a discussion of these cases see infra part H.C.4.
58. THE NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1298 (William H. Harris & Judith S.
Levey eds., 4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA].
59. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(3) (Eng.).
60. R. v. Pearce, 72 Crim. App. 295 (1980) (Eng.).
61. Thorne v. British Broadcasting Corp., 2 All E.R. 1225 (CA. 1967) (Eng.).
62. R. v. Malik, 52 Crim. App. 140 (1968) (Eng.). For a full account of the
speech, see Bitter Attack on Whites, THE TIMES (London), July 25, 1967, .at 1
[hereinafter Bitter Attack]. For an account of the trial, see Michael X Gives Views
on Colour, THE TIMfEs (London), Nov. 9, 1967, at 3 [hereinafter Michael X]. During
his speech, Michael X went on to say,
[Vol. XIX:2738
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to whites, but claimed that he should have the right to respond
to "certain things that have happened to us as a people."63
In another case, four prominent members of the Universal
Coloured People's Association who made speeches at Speakers'
Corner, Hyde Park were also convicted of incitement to racial
hatred.' The defendants had called on black nurses to give
white patients the wrong injections.65 In his defense at trial,
one of the defendants claimed that "[hie was merely expressing
the frustration of coloured people and was not contravening
the Race Relations Act."" It would appear, therefore, that
some political speech has been suppressed under the guise of
incitement to racial hatred.
The consent requirement has also resulted in the underuse
of the law. From 1965 to 1976, the Attorney General gave his
consent to prosecute only twenty-one people for alleged offens-
es under section 6 of the Race Relations Act." Considering
that 106 complaints were sent to the office, it would appear
Killing is a strange thing. Before I killed for the first time I wondered if
I would have a conscience. But I slept well. And now I am no longer
afraid.
I saw in this country in 1952 white savages kicking black women.
If ever you see a white man lay hands on a black woman, kill him im-
mediately. If you love our brothers and sisters you will be willing to die
for them.
Bitter Attack, supra. By calling on his followers to kill, Michael Xs speech bor-
dered on incitement to violence. Under U.S. law, such speech would not be punish-
able unless it was intended to incite imminent lawless action and the advocacy
was likely to result in such action. See discussion infra part III.
63. Michael X, supra note 62, at 3.
64. See R. v. Sawh; R. v. Watson; R. v. Ghose; R. v. Ezekiel as described in
Sentences Today, supra note 57, and Race Speeches: £270 Fines, supra note 57.
65. Sentences Today, supra note 57. In the United States, in Watts v. United
States, a black draft resister asserted that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle,
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). Con-
sidering the context of the speech (made at an anti-war rally) and the laughter
that followed the statement, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
speaker's words posed a true threat. Rather, the Court held that the speech was
"a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the Pres-
ident." Id. at 707.
66. Sentences Today, supra note 57, at 3.
67. Leopold, supra note 5, at 394.
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that the Attorney General did not consider the incitement laws
to be a top priority.6
D. The Race Relations Act, 1976
In an effort to make prosecutions for incitement easier,
section 70 of the Race Relations Act, 1976 (RRA 1976) discard-
ed the intent requirement. 9 Thus, convictions could be based
upon the mere proof that the speech or publication of "threat-
ening, abusive, or insulting" words was likely to stir up hatred
against "any racial group in Great Britain."0 This change in
the law was designed, in part, to address the difficulty in gain-
ing a conviction in the Southern News case. 1
With the passage of RRA 1976, the prosecution no longer
had to prove that the defendant had the intent to stir up. ha-
tred. Rather, the defendant's intent was inferred from the fact
that he had used insulting speech. 2 In R. v. Knight73 the de-
fendant admitted to having published a racist pamphlet, but
stated that he had abandoned any plans to distribute it. Even
though the pamphlets remained boxed up in Knight's apart-
ment, the trial judge obviously inferred Knight's intent to in-
cite to racial hatred.' Faced with such a certain outcome,
68. Leopold, supra note 5, at 394. The National Council for Civil Liberties
(Liberty) has proposed making incitement an arrestable offence and has also called
for the removal of the Attorney General's consent to prosecution. Lasson, supra
note 11, at 172. While Liberty has been a staunch supporter of the incitement
laws since their inception, its counterpart in the United States, the American Civil
Liberties Union (4CLU), often opposes attempts to curb hate speech. See generally
Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1993) (counsel for appellees); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992) (amicus brief opposing St. Paul's right to curb racist speech submitted by
ACLU).
69. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70 (Eng.). The new legislation also
moved those provisions of the 1965 Act that dealt with racial incitement back into
the 1936 Act. Id.
70. Lasson, supra note 11, at 171.
71. See Race Act Not a Curb, supra note 36, at 2; Four Cleared in Race Act
Trial, supra note 36, at 2. See also, Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70 (Eng.);
Kretzmer, supra note 48, at 501.
72. Leopold, supra note 5, at 404.
73. 2 Crim. App. (S) 82 (1980) (Eng.).
74. See id. Having decided not to distribute the literature, the case against
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Knight pleaded guilty to a charge of publishing a racist pam-
phlet in violation of RRA 1976."
The liberalization of the law proved useful in helping pros-
ecutors to win most of the cases that went to trial under the
incitement laws. Many of these involved the publishing of
similar types of racist pamphlets. In R. v. Edwards,76 an edi-
tor was convicted of violating the RRA 1976 for having pub-
lished The Stormer, which contained several comic strips in-
cluding "Billy the Yid," and "Ali the Paid." The former de-
scribed the alleged "ritualistic practice of Jews in crucifying
Christian boys in order to use their blood for their meals."77
Convinced that the pamphlet was "clearly one which incited
readers to racial hatred," the trial judge sentenced Edwards to
twelve months imprisonment.78
Despite the new ease with which convictions could be won,
the Attorney General consent requirement still hampered the
realization of the incitement law's potential. In the period
between 1976 and 1981, only twenty-one defendants faced trial
on charges of racial incitement.79 Even with the relaxation of
the government's burden, there were few prosecutions consid-
ering the rise in racial strife and violence during that peri-
od.80
Knight would appear rather weak. Under U.S. legal analysis, the crucial element
of mens rea, intent to incite to hatred, was missing and should have resulted in
an acquittal. Rather than acquit, the trial judge merely sentenced Knight to a fine
rather than imprisonment to account for the lack of distribution.
75. Id.
76. 5 Crim. App. (S) 145 (1983) (Eng.).
77. Id. at 147.
78. Id. at 146. See also R. v. Reif & Cole, 1 Crim. App. (S) 111 (1979) (Eng.)
(defendants convicted for having published stickers and pamphlets making dqroga-
tory statements about blacks and West Indians); R. v. Morse and Tyndall, 8 Crim.
App. (S) 369 (1986) (Eng.) (defendants convicted for publishing a newspaper tend-
ing to stir up racial hatred, called the British Nationalist).
79. Lasson, supra note 11, at 171.
80. Cotterrell, supra note 56, at 378. In 1985 three out of seven prosecutions
brought for racial hatred were successful; and in 1986, ten out of twelve succeed-
ed. Robert Silver, Ban Race Gibes with New Law, THE TIMES (London), June 11,
1991, at 31. In an odd twist, the Attorney General used the incitement law to ban
an anti-fascist demonstration in 1977. After three months of negotiations, the At-
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E. Public Order Act, 1986
1. Incitement to Racial Hatred
In a further effort to strengthen the incitement laws, Par-
liament passed Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 (POA
1986)."1 Most importantly, the law invokes standards original-
ly introduced in the POA 1936. Under section 18, the "use of
threatening, abusive, or insulting words" is an offense if the
speaker: a) intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or b) hav-
ing regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be
stirred up thereby.82 Now, a person can be punished for either
the intent to stir up racial hatred or for using words likely to
stir up hatred.'
During the Parliamentary debate over amending the POA,
many members sought to strengthen the law further by de-
creasing the Attorney General's role in the prosecution for
incitement." Facing strong opposition from Prime Minister
Thatcher's supporters in Parliament, this initiative finally
failed.' However, a compromise measure created new proce-
dures for investigating instances of racial incitement. Under
the old measures, an initial police determination was sent
directly to the Attorney General for consideration. Under the
POA of 1986, the local police send their determination up
torney General lifted its ban on the Anti-Nazi League and let 80,000 people march
through London's East End where the National Front had achieved recent electoral
success. NEIER, supra note 29, at 157.
81. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18 (Eng.).
82. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18(a)-(b) (Eng.). Section 18(5) of the Act
creates the following exception:
A person who is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred is
not guilty of an offense under this section if he did not intend his words
or behaviour, or the written material, to be, and was not aware that it
might be, threatening, abusive, or insulting.
POA 1986, § 18(5).
83. Section 18(3) allows the police to "arrest without warrant anyone he rea-
sonably suspects is committing an offense under this section."
84. 89 PARL. DEB. H.C. 859 (1986), cited in Lasson, supra note 11, at 172.
85. Lasson, supra note 11, at 172-77.
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through the hierarchy of the Crown Prosecution Service where
further investigations may be undertaken." Perhaps it was
thought that with these further investigations, a stronger case
would be presented to the Attorney General and, therefore,
there would be a greater likelihood that the case would get the
Attorney General's consent.17 One danger of the new proce-
dures, however, is that they create more levels at which the
police may decide to forego prosecution before the case even
reaches the Attorney General."
For unknown reasons, there have been only three prosecu-
tions for incitement to racial hatred since passage of the POA
1986.89 The first prosecution took place in 1988 and resulted
in a suspended sentence for a "soapbox orator" who had made
a racist speech and had distributed racist literature." The
second prosecution, also in 1988, resulted in the conviction of a
neo-Nazi who posted anti-Semitic stickers on lamp-posts.9' As
of the end of 1990, sixteen more cases were being investigated
by the police for possible prosecution.92
Since its first enactment in 1965, Great Britain has been
trying to make the incitement law more effective by changing
technical weaknesses in the law.93 Since the recent reforms in
1986, there have been further calls to make prosecution of the
law even easier. For instance, Eldred Tabachnik, Q.C., has
made "far-reaching" proposals for reform of POA 1986." He
aims to pass "a new law to penalise [sic] racial 'vilification,' a
lesser form of attack than incitement to racial hatred."95 Con-
86. Bindman, supra note 42, at 26.
87. Bindman, supra note 42, at 26.
88. Bindman, supra note 42, at 26.
89. Bindman, supra note 42, at 27.
90. Bindman, supra note 42, at 27.
91. Bindman, supra note 42, at 26.
92. John Winder, More Racist Papers Being Published, THE TIMES (London),
Dec. 4, 1990, at 6.
93. Bindman, supra note 42, at 26.
94. Robert Silver, Ban Race Gibes with New Law, THE TIMES (London), June
11, 1991, at 31.
95. Id. Such a law would proscribe even the utterance of racist insults, with-
out any inquiry into the words' harassing or annoying effect.
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sidering the incitement law's relative ineffectiveness despite
repeated revisions, it is unlikely that further reforms will
make it more effective.
2. Harassment
With a completely different focus, Parliament, in 1986,
also made punishable verbal or symbolic speech that was in-
tended and likely to harass another person. Under the POA
1986 section 5,
(1) [a] person is guilty of an offense if he
(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,
or disorderly behaviour, or
(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation
which is threatening, abusive or insulting within the hearing
or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm, or
distress thereby.
And section 6 provides:
(4) A conviction under this section requires that the accused
is aware that [the speech or conduct] may be threatening,
abusive, or insulting."
Although the new law prohibits the same type of speech as
the incitement laws (threatening, abusive or insulting), the law
addresses hateful speech used in a very different context.97
Unlike the bans on incitement to hatred, which seek to reduce
persuasive speech, this new law targets hate speech that is
directed at a particular individual. Thus, the law focuses on
96. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
97. Under § 5(2), an offense under this section may be committed in a public
or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or
behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation is dis-
played, by a person inside a dwelling and the other person is also inside that or
another dwelling. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 5(2) (Eng.). This provision
ensures that the law will not be used for instances of domestic verbal abuse.
Gavin McFarlane, Public Order-Reform Against a Dark Background, 83 LAW
SOCY GAZETTE, 278, 279 (1986).
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the effect that speech has on the individual victim of abusive
speech.98
The legislative history of the law reveals that it was intro-
duced to address a variety of hurtful speakers. These include
"disturbers in the common parts of blocks of flats," and "persis-
tent shouters of abuse or obscenities at people queuing for
public transport, halls, and cinemas."' By introducing the bill
to Parliament, however, the Home Secretary said he hoped
section 5 would be used in cases of racial abuse.100
When it was introduced, some feared that the harassment
law would unduly, infringe upon cherished notions of free
speech. Cathy Lloyd, of Liberty,10 noted that social protest
often involved the "use of abuse and insults" but argued that
"public protest helps to ensure that a steady process of peace-
ful social change is achieved."02 Recent interpretations of the
law, however, show that the law will not be used to punish
speech unless the intent of the speaker is specifically to harass
a particular individual.
In DPP v. Clarke,08 Lord Justice Nolan refused to con-
vict Michael Edward Clarke of harassment because it was. not
proven that he subjectively intended to harass the complain-
ants. Clarke was accused of harassment for having carried a
picture of an aborted fetus while protesting outside of a li-
censed abortion clinic. The prosecution argued that Clarke
must have been aware that his conduct would harass the cli-
98. Section 5 also has a much smaller penalty than that for incitement: Sec-
tion 5 "is given a guideline fine of £100." Stephen Gold, And You Shall Be Guided
By Your Association, 139 NEW L.J. 1338, 1338 (1989).
99. Stephen Gold, Order, Order, 137 NEW L.J. 256, 256 (1987).
100. Bindman, supra note 42, at 25. See also "Hate Speech" and Freedom of
Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 7 (Mar. 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
101. See supra note 68 for a description of Liberty, the British counterpart of
the American Civil Liberties Union.
102. Brother-in-Law, The Queen's Peace, 83 LAW SocY GUARDIAN GAZETrE
2495, 2495 (1986).
103. See Objective Test for Reasonable Conduct Defense, THE TIMES (Loiidon),
Aug. 27, 1991, at 25 [hereinafter Objective Test] (discussing unreported Clarke
case).
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ents at the clinic. The judge rejected an objective test that
would have inferred Clarke's intent to harass from the circum-
stances of the protest.' 4 According to Lord Justice Nolan, the
words "is aware that it may be threatening, abusive, or insult-
ing" in section 6(4) demanded nothing less than an inquiry into
the subjective intent of the defendant."5
To date, the harassment statute has only been used to
prosecute persons who assault traditional standards of public
decency. In one case, the defendant was convicted for harass-
ment of a police officer during an arrest."6 Other cases have
been brought against men for kissing in the street'°7 and
against abortion activists who display fetuses at demonstra-
tions.08
Section 5 has the potential for punishing racist speech that
is not covered by the incitement laws. It is hard to predict at
this early stage what types of conduct or speech will be the
focus of the Crown's prosecutions. However, Lord Justice
Taylor has expressed a willingness to convict soccer spectators
who subject non-white players to "obscenities."0 9
104. Id.
105. Id. See also Gold, supra note 99, at 256.
106. D.P.P. v. Orum, 153 J.P. 85 (1988) (Eng.).
107. See generally Mike Seabrook, Homosexuality and the Police, 142 NEW L.J.
325, 325 (1992).
108. Objective Test, supra note 103. The charges were dismissed by Lord Jus-
tice Nolan and Mr. Justice Rougier of the Queen's Bench Division. Id.
Local police are acting to stamp on a rash of obscene T-shirts and hats
in the Lincolnshire coastal towns of Skegness and Mablethorpe. Some
hats with male genitalia as decoration have been seized and passed to
the Crown Prosecution Service for advice and possible action against the
wearers. Any charges will be under the Public Order Act 1986 § 5(1).
Keep Your Shirt Off, 137 NEW L.J. 581, 581 (1987). See also D.P.P. v. Fidler,
Proving Compulsion in Watching and Besetting, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 27,
1991, at Features sec.; McConnell v. Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester
Police, 1 All E.R. 423 (CA. 1990) (Eng.); Chappell v. D.P.P., 89 Crim. App. 82
(1988) (Eng.); and D.P.P. v. Orum, 153 J.P. 85 (1988) (Eng.).
109. Quentin Cowdry, Doubts Emerge on Taylor Report, THE TIMES (London),
Feb. 6, 1990, at 40.
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F. Summary of British Hate Speech Legislation
As can be seen, Great Britain's attempts to ban hateful
speech have taken many forms: the alien and sedition laws
banned speech that provoked violence; the POA 1936 banned
abusive speech that was intended to or resulted in incitement
to violence; the RRA 1965 banned abusive speech that was
intended to and was likely to incite to racial hatred; the RRA
1976 banned abusive speech that was likely to incite to racial
hatred; and the POA 1986 banned speech that was either in-
tended to or was likely to result in an incitement to racial ha-
tred. Finally, the POA 1986 also banned abusive speech that
was intended to harass and resulted in the harassing of a
particular individual. The viability of these laws in the United
States will be discussed after a description of curront First
Amendment doctrine.
III. REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
Legislative bodies and courts in the United States are
much more tolerant of hate speech than their counterparts in
Great Britain. In fact, the First Amendment. was created in
direct response to the British sedition laws which made criti-
cism of the government illegal."' While a few categories of
110. 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111. But see generally JAMES MORTON SMrITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIIL LIBERTIES (1956) (discussing the Alien
and Sedition Acts passed in 1798). See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). Under the Acts, the President had the power to imprison or deport
aliens suspected of activities posing a threat to the national government. They
were eventually abandoned by Congress and President Jefferson. In describing
Madison's condemnation of the law, Brennan wrote:
His premise was that the Constitution created a form of government
under which "The people, not the government, possess the absolute sover-
eignty." The structure of the government dispersed power in reflection of
the people's distrust of concentrated power and of power itself at all
1993]
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speech including obscenity, defamation, and fighting words
may be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content, the United States Supreme Court has used the First
Amendment to strike a number of federal and state restric-
tions on speech that would fall under the definition of "hate
speech.""
Given the current state of First Amendment law, there-
fore, it is unlikely that the United States Senate will ratify the
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination. Although the United States signed the Conven-
tion, it did so with the following caveat:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for
the protection of individual rights, such as the right of free
speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to
require or to authorize legislation or other action by the Unit-
ed States of America incompatible with the provisions of the
Constitution of the United State of America."'
Congress has never ratified the Convention because of article 4
of the Convention. As described above, article 4 would require
the United States to "declare an offense punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or ha-
tred." 4
A. The "Fighting Words" Doctrine
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the United States Su-
preme Court held that "fighting words" are not protected by
levels. This form of government was "altogether different" from the Brit-
ish form under which the Crown was sovereign and the people were sub:jects.
Id. at 274, (citing 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 569-70).
112. RJ.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2540 (1992).
113. Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Egon Schwelb, The United States and the Unit-
ed Nations Treaty on Racial Discrimination, 8 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIL LEGAL POL"
85 (1975). Signature does not bind the United States to the treaty until the sign-
ing is ratified.
114. see NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1980); see also supra note 33.
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the First Amendment."5 Fighting words have been defined as
those words that, "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace.""6 In Chaplinsky,
a Jehovah's Witness who called a city marshall a "God damned
racketeer... a damned fascist," was convicted under a statute
that provided that "no person shall address any offensive,
derisive or annoying word to any other person w ho is lawfully
in any street or other public place.""7 In upholding the con-
viction, the Supreme Court held that "[riesort to epithets or
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the [Constitution]."
There are two parts to the fighting words doctrine. The
first involves words that "inflict injury," and the second in-
volves words that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Prohibiting the latter is consistent with the holding of
Brandenburg v. Ohio, in which the Supreme Court held that
government can prohibit words likely to "incite imminent law-
less action.""1
8
In Brandenburg v. Ohio," the leader of a Ku Klux Klan
group was convicted under an Ohio Syndicalism statute which
made illegal "advocacy of the duty of crime." Brandenburg had
led a Ku Klux Klan meeting that was filmed and shown on
television. At the meeting, a cross was burned and
Brandenburg stated that "[p]ersonally, I believe the nigger
should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel."' 0
The Supreme Court focused on other words spoken by
Brandenburg that day: "[If the President... continues to
suppress the white race.., it's possible that there might have
to be some revengeance [sic] taken."" In striking the Ohio
115. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942). Under First Amendment analysis, when a type
of speech is not protected by the First Amendment, government is free to censure
it.
116. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
117. Id. at 569.
118. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 446.
12f. Id.
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statute, the Court found that Brandenburg's words were not
likely to result in any "revengeance" being taken any time in
the near future. The Court held that speech may only be re-
stricted if it is intended to incite imminent lawless action and
if the advocacy is likely to result in such action." By prohib-
iting speech that did not pass this test, the statute under
which Brandenburg was convicted was found to be unconstitu-
tionally overbroad."
The other part of the fighting words doctrine allows gov-
ernment to prohibit words that "by their very utterance inflict
injury." Theoretically, this doctrine allows the government to
condemn speech regardless of its nexus to any violence or law-
less action.' In the recently decided case RA.V. v. City of
St. Paul,' the Supreme Court held that these fighting words
can be regulated because of "their constitutionally proscribable
content."2 The Court went on to state that government can-
not regulate fighting words based on "hostility or favoritism
toward a nonproscribable message that they contain."27
122. Id. at 447. The Supreme Court has held that "true threats" foretell the
imminence of violence to a degree that they can be punished by law. Watts v.
U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969). As the American Civil Liberties Union recently noted,
[Gleneralized comments can often be answered through debate in a way' that
targeted threats against specific individuals simply cannot." Brief Amicus Curiae of
the American Civil Liberties Union at 7, RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538
(1992) [hereinafter ACLU Amicus Briefl. See also 18 U.S.C. § 241 which makes it
a crime to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the
same . . . ."; Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1991).
Restrictions on verbal invasions of privacy have also been found constitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975).
123. Under both state and federal constitutional law, a statute is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad if it substantially infringes upon protected free speech even
though legislative intent may have been to restrict unprotected speech. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
124. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
125. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992).
126. Id. at 2540, 2545.
127. Id. at 2538, 2540, 2545.
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In R.A.V., a teenage boy burned a cross on the front lawn
of black family in St. Paul, Minnesota. Although it did not
attribute any specific statements to the boy himself, the prose-
cution contended that he and his cohorts made reference, prior
to the cross burning, to "skinhead trouble" and "burning some
niggers."m The boy was charged with violating the St. Paul
bias motivated disorderly conduct ordinance which provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, ob-
ject, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the ordi-
nance violated the long-standing principle of content neutrality
and, further, that the ordinance discriminates against speech
that espouses unacceptable viewpoints.
The Court agreed with defendant that the ordinance is
content based and therefore in violation of the Constitution.
The reasoning is based on the fact that the ordinance only
outlaws certain types of bias motivated speech and not others.
The Court noted that government cannot prohibit speech which
addresses only disfavored subjects such as race, color, creed,
religion, and gender."'
While content based laws prohibit broad categories of
speech (e.g., political speech), a viewpoint-based law sanctions
a particular view (e.g. endorsement of the Democratic Party),
while prohibiting another (e.g. an endorsement of the Republi-
can Party).'3' Viewpoint based regulations have never passed
128. ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 122, at 2.
129. St. Paul, Minn. Leg. Code, City Ordinance § 292.01 (1990). Many states
have adopted similar laws. See e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 20; FLA. STAT. §§ 876.17-
.20 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14.12-.14 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1301-1306
(1981). See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2346.
130. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538, at.2540, 2545 (1992).
131. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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constitutional muster.112 By prohibiting language that oppos-
es racial tolerance, the Court argued, the drafters of the St.
Paul ordinance were motivated by a desire to suppress opin-
ions that they considered repugnant.' While these goals are
laudable, the Court found that they could be achieved through
less speech-restrictive means. The Court specifically noted that
the defendant could have been prosecuted under Minnesota's
laws attacking "terroristic threats."'8
A United States district court used reasoning similar to
that of RAV. to strike the University of Wisconsin's (UW)
hate speech code. To address an increasing number of racist
and sexist incidents on campus, the University of Wisconsin
adopted regulations that prohibited speech which
1) Is racist or discriminatory,
2) Is directed at an individual;
3) Demeans the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the
individual addressed; and
4) Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environ-
ment for education, university-related work, or other univer-
sity-authorized activity.1"
Since part 4 of the regulation did not confine its prohibition to
speech that would incite a violent reaction, the trial court
argued, it regulated speech that was outside the confines of the
fighting words doctrine.' For authority, the district judge
cited Gooding v. Wilson.' In Gooding, the Supreme Court
132. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 745, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
133. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992). See also ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note
122, at 4.
134. 112 S. Ct. at 2541. As discussed below, "true threats" are not entitled to
constitutional protection. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Cer-
tainly, the burning of a cross and making references to some "skinhead trouble"
and "burning some niggers" would constitute a threat to the lives of the black
family targeted in RAV.
135. WIs. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2).
136. U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774
F.Supp. 1163, 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
137. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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cited Chaplinsky for the proposition that a breach of the peace
statute must be limited "to words that have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually,
the remark is addressed."'" Since the UW rule prohibited
certain of these "words that wound," it was unconstitutionally
overbroad 3 9
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul sets the stage for any attempt at
curbing hate speech through legislation. While RA.V. leaves
the door open for legislation that addresses words that "by
their very utterance inflict injury," this legislation must not
attempt to distinguish words based on a viewpoint repugnant
to the drafters. Seemingly, unless legislatures are willing to
ban all categories of hurtful speech, such regulations will be
found unconstitutional under current Supreme Court fighting
words precedent.
B. Defining 'Hatred"
Another obstacle for hate speech legislation is the difficul-
ty of definition. The UN Convention on Racial Discrimination
would require the United States to outlaw speech that Was
merely based on "racial superiority or hatred" without regard
to any impending violence. 4 A law based on words that con-
note "hatred" would fail for vagueness under First Amendment
analysis." In Collin v. Smith," hatred was found to be too
subjective and difficult to define. In that case, the village of
138. Id. at 524.
139. Id.
140. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, su-
pra note 6, art. 4. Thus, the United States has not gone beyond what the British
had prohibited in 1936 Public Order Act.
141. A law is unconstitutionally vague if a person of average intelligence can-
not tell what is prohibited speech and what is not. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241 (1967) (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); see
also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 6111 (1971); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,
231-32 (1951).
142. 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aft'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
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Skokie, Illinois had enacted several ordinances to neutralize a
Nazi demonstration.' One of them forbade the dissemina-
tion of any materials which promote or incite racial or religious
hatred.' The district court cited Supreme Court precedent
for the proposition that a citizen has the right to "incite unrest,
dissatisfaction, and even anger with social conditions."145
Even if the court were to accept that incitement to hatred was
unprotected by the First Amendment, it would be unable to
distinguish between speech that incited to "anger with social
conditions" and speech that incited to hatred. 46
To illustrate the definitional dilemma, the court noted that
the plaintiff neo-Nazis believed that "busing programs," used
to integrate schools, posed a threat to the quality of the public
school system.47 They also believed that blacks and Jews
were the instigators of busing.' The court noted that the
neo-Nazis had a right to make this argument.'49 If incitement
to hatred were illegal,
at what point does a vehement attempt to arouse public an-
ger at busing become an attempt to incite hatred of blacks
and Jews? A society which values 'uninhibited, robust and
wide-open debate cannot permit criminal sanctions to turn
upon so fine a distinction."
Rather than risk infringement on speech that addressed issues
of public interest, the First Amendment dictates that society
endure speech that incites to hatred.
C. Regulating Offensive Speech
The Supreme Court has also ruled that words that are
merely offensive or that merely produce anger, annoyance, or
143. 447 F. Supp. at 680-81.
144. Id. at 681.
145. Id. at 692 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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alarm are words that warrant First Amendment protection. In
Cohen v. California,'' the Court addressed the application of
a statute which prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturbing
the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive
conduct.""2 Cohen had been convicted of violating the statute
after he donned a jacket that bore the legend, "Fuck the
Draft." In reversing the conviction, the Court held that "pro-
fane, offensive language is nonetheless First Amendment
speech" that could not be censored.'53
Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson," the Court confronted a
statute that outlawed burning the United States flag. In strik-
ing down the statute, the Court held that the intent of the
statute was to ban a type of expression because of its "offen-
siveness" to others, a justification that was rejected in Co-
hen. 5' In dicta, Justice Brennan specifically stated that ideas
of racial superiority, offensive as they may be, are protected by
the First Amendment. 6 Even concepts "virtually sacred to
our Nation," such as the preservation of the integrity of the
flag and the equality of the races do not merit exceptions from
the First Amendment protections of speech. 57
State courts have followed suit in determining that mere
offensiveness of speech is not sufficient for suppression of
speech. In N.Y. v. Dietze,"' New York's highest court struck
down a statute that proscribed "the use of 'abusive' language
with the intent to 'harass' or 'annoy."' 59 There, the Court of
151. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 25.
154. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
155. Id. at 413-14.
156. Id. at 418.
157. Id.
158. 549 N.E.2d 1166 (N.Y. 1989); see also People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988);
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. App. 1984). In Harrington, the court voided
a statute that punished obscene or abusive language spoken with intent to "annoy
or alarm." Id. at 669. The court found that such language was protected under
both parts of the Chaplinshy fighting words doctrine. Id. at 670.
159. 549 N.E.2d at 1167 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25(2)). The court of ap-
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Appeals found that speech which merely "annoys" cannot be
proscribed under the New York or Federal Constitution. Judge
Hancock reasoned that language that merely annoys does not
"inflict injury" within the meaning of Chaplinsky."
D. Harassment
One area of hate speech regulation that appears to pass
Constitutional muster concerns speech that reaches the level of
harassment. The Supreme Court ha explicitly held that ha-
rassing language and conduct in the workplace is not protected
speech.16' Specifically, the Court has held that harassment
based on gender or race is a violation of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.'62 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the
Court noted that harassment in the workplace can "destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minori-
ty group workers."" The Court found valid the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) standard for
prohibiting harassment under Title VII. The EEOC finds ac-
tionable under Title VII:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.'
peals noted that words which, "by their utterance alone, inflict injury," are punish-
able under the state and federal constitutional law. Id. at 1168. It further noted
that a harassment statute could be narrowly written to encompass only these
words. Id.
160. Id.
161. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Gray v.
Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
162. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 176; see also Comptson v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club,
568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
163. 477 U.S. at 66, (citing Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
164. 477 U.S. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). This standard is
very similar to the University of Wisconsin law struck by the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. Some scholars think that such restrictions on harassment should be
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The Court went on to note in dicta, however, that some offen-
sive speech and conduct is not severe enough to be labeled
harassment under Title VII."6 For harassment to be action-
able, "it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.''"
In Boos v. Barry,117 the Supreme Court upheld a ban on
harassing speech that occurs outside of the workplace. In Boos,
the Court rejected a provision of the District of Columbia Code
which prohibited, within 500 feet of a foreign embassy, "the
display of any sign that... tends to bring the foreign govern-
ment into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute.""'8 Finding this
law to be an unconstitutionally content-based regulation,169
the Court pointed to less speech restrictive alternatives for
achieving the government's interests."' For instance, 28
U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) places a ban on a protester's attempts to
"intimidate, coerce, threaten or harass" foreign officials. Ac-
cording to the Court, this ban would sufficiently protect the
safety and security of foreign dignitaries and officials. One
scholar has noted that by inference, 28 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) is
"presumably" constitutional. 7' On the other hand, the Court
noted, it would be an improper application of the law to use it
to protect merely the officials' feelings or sensibilities. 2
limited to the workplace. See Aryeh Neier and Nan Hunter's comments at Cardozo
Law School Symposium on Hate Speech, Nov. 1991.
165. 477 U.S. at 67.
166. Id., (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
167. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
168. Id., (citing D.C. CODE § 22-1115).
169. The notion of content neutrality was first elucidated by the Supreme
Court in Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which held that, "[above] all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.* Id. at
95.
170. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 324-26.
171. JOEL GORA, THE RIGHT TO'PROTh5T 60 (1991).
172. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); see generally GORA, supra note 171, at
60.
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Laws prohibiting harassment outside of the workplace
have also been upheld by the lower federal courts.178 For in-
stance, the Third Circuit was confronted with the constitution-
ality of 47 U.S.C. § 223, the federal telephone harassment
statute.'74 Defendants in that case argued that the law was
content-based in violation of the First Amendment. By banning
some types of telephone communication and not others, it was
argued, 47 U.S.C. § 223 violated the First Amendment.
The Third Circuit, however, held that the telephone ha-
rassment statute was not trying to suppress the communica-
tion of ideas, but was merely prohibiting abusive conduct."5
Because the intent of the statute was to protect the victims of
harassment, the law did not violate the axiom of content neu-
tralityY 6 Since the statute furthered the substantial govern-
ment interest of protecting victims of harassment, it was found
to be constitutional.'77
E. Summary of U.S. Caselaw on Hate Speech'
Any attempt at hate speech legislation in the United
States faces a significant obstacle in the First Amendment
protection of free speech. Under R.A.V., the Supreme Court
virtually closed the door on legislation that seeks to prohibit
so-called fighting words that, by their very utterance, inflict
injury. The remaining categories of hate speech, namely ha-
rassing and threatening, are the only categories which remain
open to regulation under current Supreme Court doctrine.
173. In Collin v. Smith, the district court left open the possibility of prohibiting
harassment: "It bears noting that we are not reviewing here a law which prohibits
action designed to impede the equal exercise of guaranteed rights, see e.g. 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 245, or even a conspiracy to harass or intimidate others and sub-
ject them to racial or religious hatred... If we were, we would have a very
different case." 447 F. Supp. 676 (1978).
174. United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 1978).
175. Id. at 787.
176. Id. The Supreme Court has upheld content based laws that satisfy strict
scrutiny. In those cases, the law must be narrowly tailored and necessary to serve
a compelling state interest. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
177. United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Lampley, 573. F.2d
at 787.
758 [Vol. XIX:2
HATE SPEECH LEGISLATION
IV. APPLICABILITY OF BRITISH LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Much of the debate on United States hate speech legisla-
tion is argued in the abstract. Judges, scholars, and legislators
involved in this subject spend considerable time predicting the
consequences of such legislation in order to determine whether
any law marks the top of the "slippery slope." Fortunately, we
have the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the British
as we decide whether to adopt a given measure. The following
sections will address the overall benefits and disadvantages of
the incitement and the harassment laws and their individual
constitutionality were they adopted in the United States.
A. Incitement to Racial Hatred
1. Value of the Law in Great Britain
The incitement laws have had a marginal effect on racism
in Great Britain. According to Robert Moore, a professor at
Liverpool University, "Blacks continue to be the victims of
prejudice in housing and employment, and threatened by ra-
cially motivated violence .... Black people remain just as
trapped in the lowest-paid, most unpleasant jobs, and the least
desirable homes and areas as were their immigrant parents
and grandparents."78 Similar conclusions for the continued
prevalence of anti-Semitism have been made. For instance, one
study notes that racist motivated violence increased by twenty-
five percent from 1989 to 1990; for the same period, anti-Se-
mitic incidents rose by fifty percent.17
On the other hand, one development over the last ten
years in Great Britain is that "organised [sic] British fascist
politics have all but collapsed.""8 Arguably, the incitement
178. Thomas Prentice, United Europe Likely to Affect UK Blacks, THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 30, 1991, at 4.
179. Appleyard, supra note 1; see also Raines, supra note 1.
180. Appleyard, supra note 1. The National Front is essentially nonexistent
while the 'British National party has about 1,000 members and the British Move-
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laws are partially responsible for the demise of these groups.
Certainly, the law kept leaders of the National Socialist Move-
ment and the British Nationalist Party in prison at the peak of
their careers.18'
However, these groups flourished during much of the
twenty-five year period that these laws have been in effect.
During the first ten years immediately after the inception of
the RRA 1965, Great Britain actually saw an increase in the
"number of National Front outdoor meetings."" In "the
Greater London council elections of 1977, the "National Front
won 119,000 votes, or 5.5 percent of the total votes cast.""8
Although the old fascist parties may be virtually non-exis-
tent, there are signs that organized neo-Nazism is on the rise
both in Great Britain and in the rest of Europe.'" According
to Geoffrey Alderman, a University of London Professor of
History, sporadic incidents of fascism and the popularity of
more organized groups have been increasing in Great Britain
in the last few years.1" Moreover, "there has been a clear in-
crease in the amount of anti-semitic literature in circula-
tion."86
Many weaknesses of the incitement laws may have been
responsible for the continued existence of racist and fascist
activity since the laws were developed in 1965. As discussed
above, for instance, many racist speakers and publishers were
able to elude prosecution by avoiding the "threatening, abu-
sive, or insulting" words proscribed in the incitement laws. By
referring to the problems of immigration rather than the
ment perhaps 2,00." Id.
181. See Jordan v. Burgoyne, 2 All E.R. 225 (1963) (Eng.) and supra text ac-
companying notes 24-29. See Colin Gaoled, supra note 43; R. v. Morse & Tyndall,
8 Crim. App. (S) 369 (1986) (Eng.).
182. Leopold, sufira note 5, at 398.
183. NEI-R, supra note 29, at 149.
184. Even in Germany where the National Socialism is banned outright, neo-
Nazism is seeing a comeback. Marc Fisher, Youthful Face of Germany's Neo.Nazis,
WAS. POST, Mar. 2, 1992, at Al.
185. Appleyard, supra note 1.
186. Appleyard, supra note 1; John Winder, More Racist Papers Being Pub.
lished, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 4, 1990, at 6.
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"Coloured Invasion," some speakers were able to continue to
spread their racist views.'87 Indeed, "[c]ode words are easily
substituted for explicit references to race."1 8
Other factors surrounding the cases that went to trial may
have actually benefited the defendants. For instance, the trials
produced publicity for little known groups and publications
that might have otherwise gone unnoticed."8 9 In addition, the
prosecutions that resulted in convictions also created martyrs
for the cause of national socialism.19
At a time when incidents of racism are on the rise, it is
interesting to note that some black leaders are calling for a
repeal of the incitement laws. Nigel Fraser, a member of the
Society for Black Lawyers, describe the incitement and other
Race Relations laws as "cosmetic" and ineffective in fighting
the root causes of racism.'9 He and his colleagues argue that
"prejudice is a disease too deep-seated to be eradicated by stat-
ute."
192
Considering the marginal success that the incitement laws
have had in Great Britain, there is no reason to introduce
them in the United States. If the laws have achieved anything,
they may have helped reduce the popularity of organized fas-
cist and racist groups and they may have reduced the preva-
lence of racist newspapers and pamphlets. However, in the
United States, the National Socialist Party and the KKK have
187. Indeed, some authors argue that the use of more "sophisticated formula-
tions of their propaganda" has led to an increase in the appeal of racist propa-
ganda." Kretzmer, supra note 48, at 507.
188. NEIER, supra note 29, at 155.
189. See Race Act Not a Curb, supra note 36; Four Cleared in Act Trial, supra
note 36.
190. Leopold, supra note 5, at 404.
191. George Hill, Still No Sign of the Melting Pot, THE TIMES (London), Aug.
20, 1990, at 14.
192. Id. While there is some agreement among black leaders that the current
laws should be repealed, there is no such agreement on what alternatives Great
Britain should turn to to. fight racism. Mukhtar Miah, a British born Bengali,
would like to see the current laws replaced with laws that are tougher on racial
violence. Glory Osaji-Umeaku, a Nigerian born businessman, argues that any spe-
cial treatment fosters dependent attitudes among minorities and creates resent-
ment in their white neighbors. Id.
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not been major forces since the 1960s and racist newsletters
are not nearly as prevalent in the United States as they are in
Great Britain.' 93
2. Problems of Enforcement
The consent of the Attorney General requirement has
created two problems that have prevented the incitement laws
from realizing their potential in fighting racism. The first prob-
lem may be described as a slippery slope dilemma: the incite-
ment laws have been used on occasions that arguably hinder
their original goals. Second, the Attorney General has failed to
give his consent to prosecute what, to many, seem to be bla-
tant examples of racist speech.
The slippery slope argument posits that a law which may
be designed to combat an evil upon which there is almost uni-
versal consensus may eventually be used against ideas for
which tolerance is required. For this reason, society needs to
protect the right to speak freely for even those people we find
offensive, even repugnant. As Aryeh Neier, the ACLU's Execu-
tive Director during the Skokie trial, once said: "It would be
more pleasant for defenders of freedom to rally around the
causes of a better class of victims. But if we wait until nice
people are victimized, it may be too late. The first place to
defend freedom is the first place it is denied."'" Civil liber-
tarians argue that regulations on free speech should not even
be put on the books for the fear that they will be used against
the wrong people.'95
Great Britain's incitement laws, though enacted for laud-
able reasons, have been used to silence those they were seek-
ing to protect. As described above, the prosecution of Michael
Abdul Malik put a prominent leader of black nationalism in
prison for eighteen months. Though he was arguably preaching
hatred of white people, he also was expressing the fundamen-
193. COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 58, at 1505.
194. NEIER, supra note 29, at 148.
195. NEIER, supra note 29, at 148.
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tally political message that blacks were not being treated fairly
in British society. Because Great Britain claims to be a democ-
racy, his speech was owed more protection. Yet, in a society
which has not yet gained a consensus on whether it is possible
to be black and British, it seems inevitable that a law as
broadly written as the incitement law would be used to prose-
cute minority group members."
The second problem with the Attorney General consent
requirement may also have political overtones: the government
has foregone the prosecution of incidents of racist speech. Both
the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Commission for
Racial Equality have repeatedly criticized the Attorney
General's office for refusing to prosecute certain cases. 197
While these groups sometimes have been able to pressure the
government to increase the number of prosecutions for incite-
ment, groups which are not typically served by these organiza-
tions have no redress.98
Both overuse and the reported underuse of the incitement
laws illustrate the difficulty in leaving far-reaching laws in the
hands of politicians. As one scholar noted, speeches that come
under the incitement laws "often have strong political over-
tones, and it should therefore not be in the hands of a politi-
cian to decide when to prosecute."
19
196. In Great Britain, the consensus against racism is "precarious." Bindman,
supra note 42, at 25.
197. Appleyard, supra note 1; Frances Gibb, Prosecutions for Provoking Anti-
Semitism to Go Ahead, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 21, 1991, at 8; Anti-Semitism,
88 LAW SOCY GAZETrE 11, 11 (1991). "The Board of Jewish Deputies is an agency
of the United Synagogue organization, and acts as a liaison between the Jewish
communities of Great Britain and the government." Lasson, supra note 11, at 178
n.100. "The Commission for Racial Equality is a quasi-governmental agency. The
Crown appoints the Commission and funds the agency, which then operates inde-
pendently." Lasson, supra note 11, at 178 n.99.
198. A Gypsy, who was unable to bring any legal action, eventually took her
case to the European Court. Her case was denied. J.P. Gardner & S. Dolle, Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights-Report on the 180th Session, 83 LAW SoC'Y
GUARDIAN GAZE'M 2827, 2827 (1986).
199. Leopold, supra note 5, at 404. Another scholar noted that,
Once the statute is on the books, authorities who passively fail to prose-
cute under it are accused of indifference to racialist poison. If however
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Considering the problems the British have had in enforc-
ing these laws, the United States should forego adopting them.
Consider, for the moment, if such a law were on the books in
Louisiana and David Duke had been elected its governor. The
broad terms "hatred" and "incite" have the potential of being
used against what most people of the United States would
consider to be valid political protest, but someone such as Da-
vid Duke would consider un-American.
3. Constitutionality of the Incitement Laws in the United
States
Even if our elected officials agreed to pass laws that pro-
hibited incitement to racial hatred, these laws would be struck
down in the federal courts as violative of the First Amend-
ment. As described above, prohibitions on speech of this sort
are only constitutional if they fall into a very narrow category
of unprotected speech. Racist speech, can only be protected if it
is likely to produce "imminent lawless action,"200 or if it con-
stitutes harassment. 0 '
The incitement law, as it now stands, asks only if the
defendants "intended" to incite racial hatred or if, by their
speech, racial hatred was likely to be incited.2 2 The conhec-
tion between persuading X to hate Y and the likelihood that X
will commit a violent act against Y is very tenuous and uncer-
tain. The fact that X may now hate Y does not mean that he or
she is "likely" to act violently toward Y. The law would there-
fore not pass the Brandenburg test that requires that violence
not only be "likely," but also "imminent."
they do prosecute anyone, they are accused of biased and selective prose-
cution. It is not clear that the resulting controversies over the use or
non-use of the law do much to promote racial tolerance.
Robert Gordon, Law and Disorder, 64 IND. L.J. 803, 812 n.18 (1988-1989).
200. Brandenburg v. Ohio,. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also supra text accom-
panying notes 118-22.
201. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
202. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18 (Eng.).
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The current United States Supreme Court interpretation
of the fighting words doctrine asks whether a person's speech
is so abusive that the person towards whom the insults are
directed is likely to start a fight with the speaker.03 The in-
citement law, however, does not inquire into the result of rac-
ist language on the victim of speech, but looks to the third
party who might be persuaded by the speech. Imagine, for
instance, if X, a white man, was using abusive language to
berate Y, a black man, and no one else was within Xs earshot.
X would not be guilty of incitement to racial hatred since there
was no one around whom he could persuade of his racist views.
While X's use of fighting words might be proscribed under the
First Amendment as harassment, it would not be violative of
the incitement law. Thus, the instances where the incitement
law may be used do not fit into the fighting words exception to
the First Amendment.
Were the Supreme Court to uphold a prohibition on speech
that incited to racial hatred, it would have to carve out a new
exception to free speech under the First Amendment. Consider-
ing the current wave of anti-politically-correct speech senti-
ment, the chances that the present conservative Court would
make an exception for disenfranchised groups are next to nil.
Moreover, there is widespread agreement among schol-
ars-including those who champion harassment codes-that
hateful speech directed toward the public should be protected
speech.2 For this type of speech, there is a consensus in the
United States that the best way to combat racist speech is to
let racists broadcast their ideas." 5 There is a fear that sup-
pressing groups like the Klan will only force them "to choose
more violent and clandestine means of obtaining its goals."206
203. Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 447.
204. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2357; Wiener, supra note 3. (1991).
205. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2352 n.165.
206. Mateuda, supra note 2, at 2352 n.165.
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B. Harassment Laws
1. Value of Great Britain's Section Five of The Public Order
Act, 1986
Section 5 of the POA 1986 targets a type of speech that
was never addressed in any of the versions of the incitement
laws. Namely, section 5 seeks to protect the person who is
harassed through the use of "abusive, threatening, or insult-
ing" language."7 As envisioned by the Home Secretary, sec-
tion 5 would be used to punish those who use verbal assaults
and abusive words in order to degrade or humiliate particular
individuals on the basis of their membership in minority
groups.
208
This new law holds great promise for two reasons. First, it
is less likely that harassing speech will be confused with politi-
cal speech. For instance, when Michael Abdul Malik pro-
claimed that "[tihe black man has soul. The white man has no
soul. He is a soulless person," 9 he could not be convicted of
harassing any individual, even if his speech could be seen as
insulting and therefore inciting to racial hatred.
The incitement law, with its broad application, has been
used to suppress speech whose main goal was to express a
political message. The harassment laws, on the other hand, are
designed to prohibit speech that it is intended to cause harm to
an individual. Rather than focusing on innocuous speeches at
Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park or on harmless pamphlets, this
law will likely focus on protecting people from abuse in resi-
dential neighborhoods, schools, and the workplace.
Second, the Attorney General is not required to consent to
a prosection of section 5. By taking away the consent require-
ment, there are less chances that the law will be used to serve
narrow partisan interests of elected officials. Thus, the Direc-
207. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 5 (Eng.).
208. Bindman, supra note 42, at 25.
209. R. v. Malik, 52 Crim. App. 140 (1968) (Eng.).
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tor of Public Prosecutions is free to seek convictions based on
the investigative work of the local police.
10
2. Constitutionality of Harassment Laws in the United
States
There is a chance that section 5 of the Public Order Act
1986 would be found constitutional under current First
Amendment doctrine. As discussed above, there is a narrow
exception available to the government when it seeks to prohib-
it harassing speech."' This exception is available to prohibit
words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace,"212 or words that
"create an abusive working environment."213
Most of section 5 of the POA 1986 fits into this narrow
exception created by the Supreme Court. The one difficulty is
found in section 5(1) which includes a prohibition on speech
that causes "alarm or distress."2 4 Speech which merely caus-
es "alarm or distress" would probably not merit prohibition
under Cohen v. California.15 and Texas v. Johnson.21
With the deletion of this portion of section 5, the harass-
ment law, as it stands, would fit into current First Amendment
analysis. Most importantly, the law does not specifically pro-
hibit speech that describes a person's "colour, race, nationality
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins"217 as does
the incitement law. Since the harassment law prohibits all
"threatening, abusive or insulting"2"' speech regardless of its
210. Bad relations between blacks and the police may still provide a political
element to the prosecution or non-prosecution of harassment. See, eg., David
Moran, Oh Henry, NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1991, at 51.
211. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
212. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
213. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vimson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
214. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 5(1) (Eng.).
215. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
216. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
217. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 3 (Eng.).
218. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
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focus, it would probably be found content neutral and therefore
constitutional."'
V. CONCLUSION
Both the United States and Great Britain have recently
experienced a marked increase in the number of racist and
anti-Semitic incidents in the workplace, on university campus-
es, and on the streets.' ° More and more, these incidents are
seen to deprive victims of hate speech of their "personal securi-
ty and liberty as they go about their daily lives."22 These
words of abuse, intended merely to harass, are not deserving of
First Amendment protection. It is possible that legislation
similar to the British laws that target harassment could pass
United States Constitutional muster. Section 5 of the POA
1986 and similar content neutral laws in the United States,
perhaps, can address incidents of hate speech while leaving
important protections of free speech intact. 2 Scholars and
legislators in the United States should monitor the current
British experimentation with laws that target harassing
speech. So far, the British harassment law has not been used
to address racist hate speech. In fact, it has been used to help
control political protesters and gays in their public activi-
ties.'
219. See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978). Because the
intent of the telephone harassment statute was the protection of the victims of
harassment, the law did not violate the axiom of content neutrality. Id.
220. Elinor Langer, The American Neo-Nazi Movement Today, 251 THE NATION
82 (1990).
221. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2321. The ACLU Policy Statement on Free
Speech and Bias on College Campuses would allow colleges and universities to
enact "disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation and
invasion of privacy... when directed at a specific individual or individuals and
when intended to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon its tar-
get.' See Nadine Strossen, Frontiers of Legal Thought II The New First Amend-
ment: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J.
484, 571, (citing ACLU Policy Statement, § 3, Oct. 13, 1990).
222. Appleyard, supra note 1; Raines, supra note 1, at Al.
223. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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As can be seen from the British experience, it is very diffi-
cult to legislate in the area of hate speech, even speech that
rises to the level of harassment, because of the tendency to
squelch free speech and public dialogue. The British experience
with hate speech legislation has made further and further
inroads into cherished legal notions of free speech,' due pro-
cess 5 , and have all but ignored the need to prove mens rea
in seeking convictions."6 Moreover, with recent increases in
racist incidents in Great Britain in the last few years, the in-
citement laws have seemingly had very little effect.
It seems clear from the history of the British laws that
mere legislation of speech will not adequately change deep-
rooted prejudice. Only education and economic development
that seeks to change attitudes and inequalities in both British
and United States societal structures will have a lasting effect
on eradicating prejudice.
Nathan Courtney
224. See supra note 95.
225. See supra note 83.
226. See supra note 74.
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